The paper aims to study the invulnerability of directed interdependent networks with multiple dependency relations: dependent and supportive. We establish three models and simulate in three network systems to deal with this question. To improve network invulnerability, we'd better avoid dependent relations transmission and add supportive relations symmetrically.
Introduction
In recent years, there has been a significant advance in studying the proportion of complex networks. Most of the studies focus on the structure and function of single networks which do not contact with other networks [1] . But in fact, almost all networks are connected with each other, such as power grid, transportation and computer control systems. As a result, the failure in one network may cause the failure in connected networks, and vice versa. Along with this process, it may lead to cascading failure and cause serious damage. These networks are called interdependent networks [2] .
Previous studies on interdependent networks are mostly restricted by this assumption: there are two networks, network A and network B. If node a in A which depends on node b in B, node b must depend on node a [3] . However, in real-world network systems, dependent relations transmission may exit. For example, node a 1 in A depends on node b 1 in B, node b 1 doesn't depend on a 1 and it depends on another node a 2 in A, node a 2 doesn't depend on b 1 and it depends on another node b 2 in B. a 1 depends on b 1 , b 1 depends on a 2 , a 2 depends on b 2 ; thus dependent relations are passed on. These networks are called directed interdependent networks.
There are two different types of dependency relations in current studies: 1) dependent-if node b depends on node a, the failure of node a must cause the failure of node b [4] . 2) supportive-if node a supports node b, the failure of node a may not cause the failure of node b; only if all nodes which support node b fail, there will be a failure of node b [5] . But it is a pity that most researchers only study one case, either dependent or supportive relation. In real-world network systems, these two types of dependency relations may exit simultaneously in one network system. For example, power grid and computer control system are connected with each other. A control center controls many generators dependently, so if there is a failure of the control center, all the generators will fail. But many generators support the control center; if a generator is failure, it may not cause the failure of the control center [6] .
This paper focuses on the invulnerability of directed interdependent networks with multiple dependency relations. Three interdependent networks have been considered: interdependent scale-free (SF) networks, interdependent Erdos-Renyi (ER) networks, and SF connected with ER network under random attack (ER network is common model for complex network research, in which each node was connected with a fix probability). Our work extends current study of interdependent network from undirected ones to directed ones, from single dependency relations to multiple dependency relations. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, three models will be established to study the invulnerability of interdependent networks. In Section 3, the model will be simulated in interdependent SF networks, interdependent ER networks, and SF connected with ER network. In Section 4, the conclusion got from this paper will be shown.
Model
An interdependent network system has been generated, which includes network A and network B. For simplicity and without loss of generality, the number of nodes in network A and B are equal. To study the invulnerability of directed interdependent networks with multiple dependency relations, we build three models: undirected interdependent networks connected by one-to-one dependent relations-UNOs; directed interdependent networks connected by one-to-one dependent relations-DNOs; directed interdependent networks connected by dependent and supportive relations-DNMs [7] . These three models are shown in Table 1 and Figures 1(a)-(c) .
Supposing that a node in network A fails if it meets anyone of the following three conditions (the same as the node in network B): isolated failure (isolated in network A), dependent failure (anyone of the nodes in network B which it depends on fails) and supportive failure (all of the nodes in network B which support it fail). There are three common strategies to attack complex networks: attack based on degree, attack based on betweenness and random attack. This paper doesn't focus on attack strategies, so that random attack is chosen as the attack strategy for simplify, which means that one node in network A is removed randomly each time. The cascading failure process of the three models is a little different [8] .
The cascading failure process of UNOs is shown below.
Step 1: Randomly remove a node in network A (remove the node together with all the edges connected to it, the same as the following ones).
Step 2: Remove the isolated node in network A and remove nodes in network Step 3: Remove the isolated node in network B and remove nodes in network A corresponding to the failing nodes in network B.
……
The cascading failure process stops unless the number of nodes either in network A or in network B is no longer dropping.
The cascading failure process of DNOs is below.
Step 1: Randomly remove a node in network A.
Step 2: Remove the isolated node in network A and remove nodes in network B which depend on the failing nodes in network A.
Step 3: Remove the isolated node in network B and remove nodes in network A which depend on the failing nodes in network B.
The cascading failure process of DNMs is a little difficult, so that there are eight steps to describe this process.
Step 1: Randomly remove a node in the network A, and then turn to Step 2.
Step 2 Step 3: Judge if there is any functional node in the network A that supports b j .
Yes, turn to Step 4; no, remove b j and turn to Step 4.
Step 4: Judge if there is any node in the network B removed in the Step 2 and Step 3. Yes, turn to Step 5; no, turn to Step 8.
Step 5: Remove the isolated node in the network B and judge the dependency relations from the failing node b i in the network B to a j in the network A. If the relation is supportive, turn to Step 6; if the relation is dependent, remove a j and turn to Step 7.
Step 6: Judge if there is any functional node in the network B that supports a j .
Yes, turn to Step 7; no, remove a j and turn to Step 8.
Step 7: Judge if there is any node in the network A removed in the Step 5 and
Step 6. Yes, turn to Step 2; no, turn to Step 8.
Step 8: Judge if there is any functional node in the network A or network B. Yes, turn to Step 1; no, end.
The form of graph has been adopted in order to express a better understanding of cascading failure process of model 3 (regard it as a stage if one network causes changes in the other network).
As shown in Figure 2 (a), the node a 2 is chosen to attack. The failure of a 2 causes the isolation of a 6 , so a 6 fails (isolated failure). As shown in Figure 2 and b 6 , so b 4 and b 6 fail. So far, all the nodes in network B fail, and the attack is over. A different situation is that the number of nodes in network A or network B is no longer dropping and the cascading failure is over, therefore, more attacks should be made to test the invulnerability of interdependent networks.
Simulation
In this section, the invulnerability of UNOs, DNOs and DNMs will be tested.
These tested models involve three interdependent networks: interdependent SF Firstly, compare UNOs with DNOs whose results are presented in Figure 3 (When attack number is zero, the initial node number of all networks is 5000, that DNMs is generated by adding dependent and supportive relations in the DNOs. The specific adding dependency relations rule is shown in Figure 5 . As well, the use of q 1 and q 2 can show the increasing degree, therefore, q = q 1 + q 2 .
There are two factors mainly considered in this study of DNMs: the deviation to add dependency relations and the increasing number of dependency relations. network B and then from network B to network A, which is to add supportive relations completely symmetrically, then p* = 0. The q* is used to indicate the deviation to add dependent relations and q* = q 1 − q 2 . If the same number of dependent relations is added from network A to network B and then from network B to network A, which is to add dependent relations completely symmetrically, then q* = 0. In Figure 6 (a), we keep p = 1, q = 0, and let p* changed within a certain range to study the impacts on the invulnerability of network systems by adding supportive relations with different deviations. As shown in Figure 6 (a), in terms of the interdependent SF networks, the network invulnerability As a result, the conclusion is that, in terms of random attack, interdependent SF networks are more robust than interdependent ER networks, whose result meets well with [10] .
Then, the deviations have been studied to add dependent relations, whose result is shown in Figure 6 (b). Keep p = 0, q = 1 and let q* changed within a certain range. As is shown is the result, in terms of interdependent SF networks, no matter completely adding dependent relations symmetrically or asymmetrically, the final attack number is about 19, with what to SF connected with ER networks and interdependent SF networks are about 9 and 6. Two conclusions can be made from these results: one is that, in terms of dependent relations, adding dependent relations symmetrically or asymmetrically has little effects on the invulnerability of network systems; the other is that, in terms of random attack, interdependent SF networks are more robust than interdependent ER networks. Figure 7 . In terms of the interdependent ER networks, the result from Figure 7 (a) can be understood. With the decrease of p, the invulnerability of network systems declines and with the decrease of q, the invulnerability of network systems raises [12] . When p = 1 and q = 0, the invul- 
Conclusion
In this paper, with multiple dependency relations, the invulnerability of directed interdependent networks has been studied. There are two types of dependency relations: dependent relation and supportive relation, which can be found in many real-world network systems. In order to cope with the invulnerability of these networks, three models are established to extend interdependent networks from undirected to directed relations, and from single dependency relations to multiple dependency relations. These models are: undirected interdependent networks connected by one-to-one dependent relation-UNOs; directed interdependent networks connected by one-to-one dependent relation-DNOs; directed interdependent networks connected by dependent and supportive relations-DNMs.
In addition, there is a simulation in interdependent SF networks, interdependent ER networks and SF connected with ER network to test the reliability of the conclusion. Comparing the UNOs with the DNOs, it is shown that the invulnerability of undirected interdependent networks is much higher than that of directed interdependent networks [13] . This reason may be that there is too much dependent relation transmission in directed interdependent networks.
Therefore, in real-world, if we want to build a survivable interdependent network, we'd better choose undirected network. Comparing the DNOs with the DNMs, two conclusions can be drawn: one is that adding supportive relations symmetrically is useful to improve the invulnerability of network systems [14] H. B. Relations from the perspective of simulation, future work can be made to study it from the analytic angle.
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